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Abstract We present the design of a secure and privacy preserving e-petition
system that we have implemented as a proof-of-concept demonstrator. We use
the Belgian e-ID card as source of authentication, and then proceed to issue
an anonymous credential that is used to sign petitions. Our system ensures that
duplicate signatures are detectable, while preserving the anonymity of petition
signers. We analyze the privacy and security requirements of our application,
present an overview of its architecture, and discuss the applicability of data
protection legislation to our system.
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Introduction
A petition is a formal request addressed to an authority and signed by
numerous individuals. Through petitions, citizens are able to express their
support or dissatisfaction with government initiatives, and provide feedback
to government institutions. In the physical world, petition signers typically pro-
vide a unique identifier (such as the national ID number) together with their
handwritten signature, so that fake or duplicate signatures can be eliminated.
Given the high cost of collecting and verifying petition signatures by hand,
it is not surprising that petitions are increasingly available online. E-petitions
present substantial advantages with respect to physical world petitions: it is
much easier to reach a large number of people potentially interested on signing
them, and the signature verification process can be automated. But they also
introduce new security and privacy challenges.
Many of the currently available electronic petitions simply collect the name
and national ID number of signers. Given that this information is not secret,
it is impossible to check that the petition signer is really providing her own
data. In other words, it is not possible to detect cheating, which diminishes the
trustworthiness of the petition signature list. To prevent this, some e-petition
servers check the IP address of the signer and allow only one signature per IP
address. But this disenfranchises legitimate signers who share the IP address
with other people (note that in some organizations thousands of users share the
same IP address). To ensure that an electronic petition signature is unique and
legitimate, it is necessary to use cryptographic means such as digital signatures.
Assuming that citizens possess electronic e-ID cards (as is the case in Belgium),
an obvious way to implement e-petitions is to have citizens sign them using the
key pair available on their e-ID card. However, such a solution is problematic
from a privacy point of view. The e-ID public key certificate (needed to verify
the digital signature) contains a lot of information about the holder of the card,
such as her name, National Registry Number, and date of birth. Revealing
all this information for the purposes of signing a petition would definitely be
against the data minimization principle, which is the legal philosophy under-
pinning data protection regulation. Data minimization constitutes that minimal
amounts of personal data may be processed, but only in as far as strictly nec-
essary for legitimate purposes. In other words, processing of data must be ad-
equate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes of collection and
processing.
Additional data protection issues arise when the petitions allow sensitive
information to be derived about the user, the processing of which is in general
prohibited by data protection legislation. As discussed in “Data protection im-
plications of e-petition”, such information can relate—among other categories
of data—to political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, all of which
are considered as “sensitive personal data” in the European Directive of Data
Protection (EC 1995).
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While signer identification is required in the physical world to ensure the
uniqueness and validity of signatures, it is possible to reconcile functional,
security and privacy requirements in its electronic version using cryptographic
techniques. We propose using the existing PKI-based electronic IDs cards (De
Cock 2009) in combination with anonymous credential protocols to ensure
that (i) signatures are legitimate, (ii) each citizen can sign a petition at most
once, and (iii) petition signers are anonymous. “Requirements” describes in
detail the privacy and security requirements that we have identified for this
application.
Our e-petition design and implementation uses the Belgian e-ID for initial
authentication, and then allows the user to obtain an anonymous creden-
tial (Chaum 1985; Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2001; Camenisch et al. 2006)
that is used to electronically sign petitions on a server. An introduction to
anonymous credentials is presented in “Anonymous credentials”. By using
anonymous credentials, our demonstrator reconciles two seemingly contra-
dictory requirements: it allows anonymous petition signing, while it imposes
restrictions on who is entitled to sign and ensures that each citizen can only
sign a particular petition once. Multiple signing of a petition with the same
anonymous credential is detectable by our protocols, such that repeated
signatures can be eliminated.
Our system architecture comprises two servers and a client run by the
citizen. We assume that the client routes its communication through an
underlying anonymous communication infrastructure, e.g., readily available
networks such as Tor (Dingledine et al. 2004) or JAP (Anonymity and Privacy
2009), to prevent identification through IP addresses. In this paper we assume
that the servers are run by the government, although in a real deployment
they may as well be administrated by other entities. The first e-government
server is a credential issuer, whose role is to issue anonymous credentials to
citizens who have authenticated with the Belgian e-ID card. The second is
the e-petition web server, which maintains the petition pages and processes
the petition signatures. The citizens use the anonymous credential obtained
from the credential issuer to interact with the e-petition server. The details
of our system architecture and protocols can be found in “Privacy-preserving
e-petition design”, while “Security analysis” presents the security analysis of
the system, and “Implementation” provides details on the implementation,
including performance measurements.
From a legal point of view, very little regulation exists specifically tailored
to e-petitions. The lack of specific rules does not mean e-petitions operate in
a legal void, as a number of regulations of a general nature are applicable.
In this paper, we focus on the data protection issues related to the proposed
e-petition application. Our design for the e-petition server aims at a notable
advance in protecting user privacy, by shielding off any and all identifiable
information about the users through the use of anonymous credentials and
anonymous communications channels. The applicability of data protection
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regulation to our design is discussed in “Data protection implications of
e-petition”.
Requirements
We assume that the Belgian e-ID registration and issuance process works
properly, and that each e-ID corresponds to a person. We also assume that
private key material is kept securely, and only available to the entity to which
it belongs. This requirement includes private key material held by the user
that is not protected by the tamper resistance of the e-ID. If a user is willing
to sell this material, he is able to sell his right to vote while still remaining in
possession of the e-ID. Removing this requirement is part of ongoing future
work. The credential issuer is trusted to function correctly and issue (only)
one credential to each valid e-ID. Finally, we assume the user has installed an
anonymous communication client1 and routes its browser requests through it.
Building on these basic trust and operational assumptions, we have identi-
fied a number of requirements that our design should comply with to provide
its functionality in a secure and privacy-preserving manner.
Strong authentication: The e-government servers have to authenticate them-
selves towards the user to prevent malicious servers
from impersonating legitimate ones. In order to pre-
vent that a citizen obtains multiple credentials, and to
ensure that the request is coming from a legitimate
user, the application requires strong authentication.
Authorization: Only citizens eligible to sign a petition should be able
to do so. For example, in some cases petitions may
only be signed by citizens of legal age, or by those
residing in a certain country or locality.
Data integrity: No entity should be able to modify the data ex-
changed between the citizen and the e-government
servers.
Confidentiality: All the data exchanges between a citizen and the e-
government servers must be kept confidential from
other entities. Additionally, traffic analysis protection
is required so that external observers are not able
to determine that a citizen is accessing the e-petition
server (or a particular petition in the server).
1Anonymous communication clients are freely available online, also as extensions that incorporate
anonymous browsing to standard web browsers (e.g., FireFox).
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Signer anonymity: The e-petition server (even in collusion with the
credential issuer) must not be able to identify
the citizens who have signed the petitions.
Multiple signing prevention: An e-petition application has to be designed in a
way it can properly detect and rectify citizen at-
tempts to sign a single e-petition multiple times.
Public verifiability: Finally, an important requirement for the trans-
parency of the e-petition signing is to provide
evidence of fair counting of petition signatures.
Anonymous credentials
Anonymous credential protocols are an active area of research in cryptog-
raphy. They were first proposed by Chaum (1985) as a privacy friendly
alternative to public key certificates. Today’s anonymous credential pro-
tocols (Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2001) rely on zero-knowledge proofs
(Goldwasser et al. 1985) to reduce to the minimum the amount of information
disclosed about their owners. The many options and features introduced in
the literature (Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2001, 2002; Camenisch et al. 2006)
allow users to protect their privacy while at the same time providing the
necessary information and security features for building secure applications.
For example, using anonymous credentials a credential issuer can encode a
user’s age in the credential. Using the credential prove/show protocol together
with zero-knowledge range proofs (Boudot 2000a) it is possible for the user to
convince a verifier that her age is above/below some threshold. The verifier
does not learn the user’s exact age, but it can check that her minimum/
maximum age is certified by the credential issuer.
A concern that is often raised about anonymous credentials is that the lack
of identification leads to a loss of accountability. Not every application, how-
ever, needs the same kind of accountability. For many applications, including
e-petitions, it is sufficient to guarantee that every user can use her credential
at most once in a given context (e.g., a concrete petition). Credentials that
implement this functionality generate a pseudo random serial number as a
result of the protocol. If the credential is used only once per context, credential
shows in different contexts are unlinkable. Reuse of the credential in the same
context, however, results in the same pseudo random serial number, meaning
that the double use of the credential is detectable.
Various cryptographic tricks can be used to create credentials that support
unlinkable and unique serial numbers. Such credentials can be realized based
on the so-called epoch number of direct anonymous attestation (Brickell
et al. 2004). By binding a different tag to every context in which a credential
is shown, k-times anonymous authentication (Teranishi et al. 2004) can be
used to create unique serial numbers. The schemes in Damgård et al. (2006)
and Camenisch et al. (2006) even support the identification of the owner of
a credential that was shown twice with the same serial number. As Martucci
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et al. (2008), our scheme uses the cryptographic techniques of Camenisch
et al. (2006) (i.e., e-tokens). We use a variant of these protocols where the
identification feature is disabled, implying that in our design the credential
shows cannot be deanonymized.
Assertion-based signatures We introduce—based on prior work in crypto-
graphic protocols—the concept of assertion-based signatures (also known in
the literature as “signatures of knowledge” Chase and Lysyanskaya 2006) as
a mechanism for enhancing the privacy of petition signers. Assertion-based
signatures are signatures associated with an assertion that—if properly defined
for the transaction in place—should give the verifier all the information needed
for assessing whether or not a signer can be trusted for the purposes of the
signature. Our approach is in line with many privacy enhancing primitives.
The assertion contains statements about attributes (of the signer) that have
been certified by an issuing organization (as part of a credential). Contrary to
third-party-issued assertions (that have a lot in common with traditional PKI-
based attribute certificates), the signer can create and prove the assertion in her
signature using only secret key material that is in her possession. The signature
generation takes as additional input the certified attributes, as being available
to the signer in the form of credentials issued by the organization.
The issuing of credentials is a more complex process than the issuance
of conventional PKI certificates. Although a lot of important work exists on
anonymous credential systems, in this work we focus on using credentials
for the purpose of signing documents (in our case, these documents are the
petitions). We combine credentials with e-tokens to detect double signing.
Further details on assertion-based signatures can be found in Camenisch
et al. (2007), that describes an XML syntax for assertion-based signatures,
and discusses the relation of assertion-based signatures to other cryptographic
primitives. For the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to note that assertion-
based signatures for various assertion types can be obtained by applying the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic (Fiat and Shamir 1987) to various privacy enhanced
authentication systems, such as existing anonymous credentials systems, group
signatures, and the e-token scheme used by us.2 Extending the assertion types
supported by the assertion-based signature naturally extends the capabilities
of the e-petition system for example to support privacy preserving proofs of
age and region codes.
Privacy-preserving e-petition design
We have implemented a demonstrator that provides the basic cryptographic
functionalities for e-petition signing and makes them accessible through a
2Similarly, an assertion-based signature scheme for general assertions generalizes group-
signatures, e-tokens signatures, e-cash, non-interactive anonymous credentials, as well as other
privacy enhancing protocols.
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web-based user interface. Our demonstrator uses the ‘identity mixer’ software
as the underlying anonymous credential system.3 The demonstrator extends
‘identity mixer’ and implements a privacy preserving protocol between a client
and two web server applications: the issuer of the anonymous credential and
the e-petition server. It also implements an interface to use the Belgian e-ID
card for authentication towards the credential issuer. Both ‘identity mixer’ and
our demonstrator are programmed in Java. We first present the architecture
of our e-petition system and then give some detail about the cryptographic
functions used.
Implementation architecture
The demonstrator comprises the issuer of anonymous credentials, an e-petition
web server, and a client, as shown in Fig. 1. The user accesses the credential
issuer web site to obtain an anonymous credential. First, the user authenticates
herself towards the credential issuer using her e-ID card. For this, we use
the existing 2-factor authentication provided by the Belgian e-ID card. Users
authenticate towards the credential issuer with their e-ID card as follows. They
insert the card in a card reader and introduce their PIN number to generate
a signature on a challenge generated by the credential issuer (steps 1 and 2
of the protocol). In this way the user proves the possession of the e-ID card and
the knowledge of the corresponding PIN number. The credential issuer uses
the citizen’s e-ID certificate to verify the digital signature on the challenge, and
extracts some attributes such as the age of the subject, which are encoded in the
anonymous credential as certified attributes. Finally, the user and credential
issuer jointly generate the anonymous credential (step 3), which is locally
stored by the user (step 4).
In our demonstrator, the petition signing and petition signature publication
processes are managed by the e-petition server, and the user is able to
(unlinkably) sign as many distinct petitions as desired with the same credential.
First, the user selects the petition that she wants to sign, and obtains its
corresponding petitionID, which is an input to the protocol. Then, she must
prove the possession of a credential certified by the credential issuer. For this,
the user reads the credential she has stored (step 5), and runs the credential
show protocol (step 6) to create an assertion-based signature. Some of our
demonstrator petitions require the user to prove not only the possession of
a valid anonymous credential, but also that her certified attributes fulfill spe-
cific conditions (additional assertions). For instance, one of the implemented
petitions is not meant for minors. If a user wants to sign that petition, she
needs to prove that her credential encodes an age that is at least 18 years old.
The e-petition server verifies whether the user has already signed the selected
petition previously, by comparing the generated pseudo random number to
that of previous signatures on that petition. If the verification reveals that the
3http://www.zurich.ibm.com/security/idemix/
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Fig. 1 E-petition system
architecture and protocols
user already signed the selected petition, it automatically rejects the double
signing attempt without revealing her real identity. Otherwise the petition
signature is accepted as valid (step 7). Finally, the e-petition server publishes
the protocol transcripts of every successful petition signature (step 8), so that
anyone can verify that their signature has been counted, and additionally check
that all transcripts correspond to signatures made by users who possess valid
credentials.
Credential protocols and e-token based signatures
Our anonymous credential protocols use cryptographic constructions with
special properties: (i) the user is able to prove to a verifier possession of
a credential certified by the credential issuer; (ii) the user is able to prove
conditions on the attributes encoded in the credential (certified by the issuer)
without revealing the attributes themselves (Boudot 2000b); and (iii) the issuer
and the verifier (e-petition server), even in collusion, cannot identify which
credential issuing corresponds to which credential show, nor can the verifier
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link credential shows as being related to the same credential, unless the citizen
does multiple signing of the same petition (Camenisch et al. 2006).
We use a special assertion-based signature scheme for signing petitions:
Camenisch et al. have proposed a protocol for periodically spendable e-tokens
(Camenisch et al. 2006). In their application scenario, sensors spend an e-token
whenever they report some data. Yet, it is only possible to compute n different
e-tokens per time period—from the key material contained in the e-token
dispenser. Consequently, sensors can file at most n reports per time period
anonymously. Otherwise the sensors have to spend some e-token twice, which
allows everyone to compute the sensor’s identity from these two e-token show
transcripts. The e-token dispenser and the e-token can be seen as a credential
and a credential show respectively.
While n-spendable e-tokens provide the necessary main functionality for
our proposal, as in (Martucci et al. 2008) we adapt the e-tokens protocol to
our application’s requirements: (i) We transform the e-token authentication
scheme into an assertion-based signature by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic
(Fiat and Shamir 1987), a cryptographic trick that turns certain interactive
proof protocols into signature schemes. (ii) Instead of a time period t, we
use an e-petition identifier petitionID. The value petitionID can be seen as
identifying the context in which a signer is allowed to sign only once.4 (iii)
We use a version optimized for n = 1 and require only detection of double
signing (instead of deanonymization of the signer). This eliminates the need
for two expensive zero-knowledge proofs: a) a proof that an integer J lies in
an interval [1, n], and b) that the double spending tag E was correctly formed.
An e-token based signature scheme as defined in (Martucci et al. 2008)
consists of the algorithms IKg, UKg, Obtain, Issue, Sign, Verify. These algo-
rithms are executed by the issuer I of the e-token dispenser, the user U , and
the signature verifier (the e-petition server). IKg and UKg are executed by
the issuer and the user upon initialization of the issuing server and the client
respectively. The secret keys need to be secured to assure that e-petitions
cannot be forged. Obtain and Issue are executed in step 3 to obtain the
dispenser credential. Sign and Verify are used in step 6 to sign and verify an
e-petition.
– IKg(1k) and UKg(1k, pkI)—creates the issuer’s key pair (pkI, skI) and
the user’s key pair (pkU , skU ) respectively. The value k is the security
parameter. Let the user’s key pair be (pkU , skU ), where pkU = gskU and
g generates a group G of known order. The issuer’s key pair is used for
creating and verifying credentials. We use a PRF fs whose range is the
group G.
– Obtain(pkI, skU ) ↔ Issue(pkU , skI)—at the end of this protocol between
a user and the e-token issuer, the user obtains an e-token dispenser D that
can be used to create one e-token based signature per petitionID. The
4Contrary to e-cash, which can be used only once, an e-petition credential can be used for signing
arbitrary many different petitions.
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dispenser D is comprised of seed s for the PRF fs, the user’s secret key
skU , and the issuer’s credential on (s, skU ). Credentials are issued in a way
such that the issuer is prevented from learning anything about s or skU . I
stores pkU to make sure that users obtain only one credential.
– Sign(m, D, pkI, petitionID)—shows an e-token from dispenser D in con-
text petitionID to sign a message m. The outputs are a token serial number
S = fs(petitionID) and a transcript τ . The transcript τ is created using
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic (Fiat and Shamir 1987) and is a non-interactive
ZK proof that S corresponds to a valid dispenser for context petitionID
(i. e., the user proves in zero-knowledge that S was properly formed from
values (s, skU ) signed by the issuer). To sign message m, m is hashed into
the challenge together with the first message and the public parameters of
the proof.
– Verify(m, S, τ, pkI, petitionID)—verifies the zero-knowledge proof τ to
check that S was created by a valid dispenser D to sign a message m in
context petitionID.
Attributes such as a user’s age or region code can be added into the system
in two ways: either by adding the attributes to the credential in the dispenser D
or by showing a separate credential cred with D together with a proof that D
and cred belong to the same user (i.e., that they have been issued with respect
to the same skU ). For simplicity and efficiency our demonstrator followed the
first approach for encoding the user’s age.
A remark on cryptography The above mechanisms employ well known tech-
niques from the area of privacy enhancing cryptography. To some extent
our choice for the e-token protocol is arbitrary, as other mechanisms for
providing similar functionality are known, e.g. direct anonymous attestation
(Brickell et al. 2004) and k-times anonymous authentication (Teranishi et al.
2004). The e-token system is however arguable the most general such system.
A credential system that supports e-tokens could for example be used to
implement electronic cash (including compact e-cash Camenisch et al. 2005)
and electronic petitions using the same building block for limiting the number
of credential shows. While other techniques may be slightly more efficient, our
implementation efforts have shown that on modern computers the impact on
performance is small.
Security analysis
Strong authentication In our design, the initial authentication of the citizen
is achieved through the Belgian e-ID card, which provides 2-factor strong
authentication (physical possession of the card and knowledge of its PIN code).
The e-government servers also authenticate themselves towards the user to
prevent malicious servers from impersonating legitimate ones. As legitimate
users show their credentials only towards legitimate servers, strong authentica-
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tion prevents man-in-the-middle attacks in the natural way. The authentication
of the e-government servers is provided through digital signatures and relies on
the security of private keys.
Authorization Our system relies on the Belgian e-ID card as authentic source
of user attributes. Petition signers are required to prove that they fulfill the
authorization criteria while executing the protocols. The unforgeability of the
anonymous credentials prohibits collusions by multiple users that want to
combine their attributes.
Data integrity Our protocols include integrity protection mechanisms that
prevent unauthorized modifications of data.
Confidentiality All the data exchanges between a citizen and the e-
government is send through secure (encrypted) communication channels.
Anonymous communication channels such as those provided by Tor
(Dingledine et al. 2004) or JAP (JAP Anonymity & Privacy 2009) should be
used as underlying communication infrastructure to guarantee traffic analysis
protection.
Signer anonymity At the data level, signer anonymity is achieved by the zero-
knowledge properties of the anonymous credential protocols. To prevent citi-
zen identification using the IP address, the citizen communicates to the servers
through an anonymous communication infrastructure (e.g., Tor Dingledine
et al. 2004).
Multiple signing prevention Our protocols provide mechanisms to detect and
remove signature duplicates, without compromising signer anonymity.
Public verifiability In our design, the e-petition server publishes the protocol
transcripts of every signature. This information can be used by a citizen to
verify that: (i) her own signature has been counted; (ii) all the transcripts
belong to signatures made by citizens who possess valid credentials; and (iii)
there are no duplicate signatures.
Implementation
Our e-petition demonstrator is a Web application coded in Java. It makes
use of the idemix code for anonymous credentials and the Belgian eID card
middleware software. However, it extends the idemix to accommodate our
restricted attribute extraction and verification needs. The middleware facili-
tates the 2-factor authentication of users towards the e-petition Web server
and retrieval of user specific credential attributes.
The demonstrator consists of two simple Web interfaces for issuing anony-
mous credential and signing e-petitions. Using the issuing server Web site,
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Table 1 Performance
measures




users can request and save anonymous e-petition credentials into secondary
memories. Once they get their credentials, they can consult the e-petition
signing server Web site. The signing Web site lets users select an e-petition,
explains the objective of the selected e-petition, enumerates the requirements
of the e-petition, and allows the signing of that e-petition. Moreover, the
signing Web site publishes the e-petition results and allows users to verify the
counting of their signatures.
Table 1 presents sample protocol related performance measures. Since the
performance measure given below is an average of ten randomly selected
protocol executions, it can give an overview of the overall efficiency esti-
mate of our demonstrator. The performance measures are tested on Intel(R)
Core(TM)2 Duo CPU with 2.00 GHz.
Data protection implications of e-petition
The privacy preserving e-petition system aims at shielding off any identifiable
information about the users through the use of anonymous credentials and
anonymous communications channels. This is an extremely important element
in comparison with the traditional e-petition systems, where no anonymity
is ensured. In those systems the user reveals a lot of information, like her
name or identification number, which is not really necessary for the needs
of the e-petition system. Such systems contradict the data minimization and
the proportionality principles, which require that only the absolutely necessary
and relevant data shall undergo processing. At this point it is important to be
reminded that the system is designed to run on an anonymous communications
layer, which will be taken as a de facto requirement in the analysis that follows.
First and foremost it needs to be examined whether the e-petition system
entails the processing of personal data and consequently whether the legal
framework on data protection—to be precise the Belgian Privacy Act of
1992 (BDP 1993) and the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995 (EC 1995)—
will apply. According to Art. 2(a) EU Data Protection Directive “personal
data” shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (‘data subject’). An identifiable person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity.5 Besides the concept of personal data,
5Compare with Art. 1 §1 of the Belgian Privacy Act.
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the Data Protection Directive provides in Art. 8 (1) for the prohibition of
the processing of special categories of data, commonly known as “sensitive
data”. Such data are the personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership and data
concerning health or sex life. The processing of the aforementioned data,
which can be revealed in various petitions, is only allowed on grounds explicitly
mentioned in Art. 8 (2)–(7) of the directive.6
Before proceeding with our analysis, we need to make a differentiation
between the communication among (i) the user and the credential issuer on
the one hand and (ii) the user and the e-petition web server on the other.
In order to obtain the anonymous credential, the user communicates with
the credential issuer by using her Belgian ID card. Indisputably, the Belgian
e-ID card is a rich source of personal data, as it contains not only the full name
of the holder and her nationality, but also the National Registry Number, date
and place of birth, noble condition, etc. (see De Cock 2009).7 In the current
design of the system, the user is fully identifiable by the credential issuer,
who in this case is processing personal data of the user in order to ensure
authentication and authorization and to issue the anonymous credential that
will be used for the e-petition signing. The credential issuer is thus rendered
controller of the data; i.e., the one that determines the purposes and the means
of the processing of personal data,8 and has to fulfil the obligations that the
data protection legislation foresees for the data controller.
Significant from a legal viewpoint is that our credential issuer does not
simply generate a credential file which it then sends to the user. If that were the
case, the credential issuer would be able to identify the owner of a given
credential. The user and the credential issuer send each other specified data
messages from which the user is able to generate a valid and verifiable
credential. As such, the credential issuer never sees the resulting credential.
The communication between the user and the e-petition web server is more
complicated when examined from a data protection point of view. A difficult
concept that needs to be explained is that a credential can be used without
handing it over, like you would hand over a token in the physical world. One
way to explain it is that the credential holder is quizzed by the petition server
and that only the holder of a genuine credential is able to give the correct an-
swers. As already mentioned, the data protection legislation only applies when
the processing of personal data takes place. When the data are anonymous and
can not be related to a natural person, their processing does not fall under the
provisions of the data protection legal framework. In our e-petition system, it
shall be examined whether the data that relate to the anonymous credential are
6Compare Art. 6–8 of the Belgian Privacy Act.
7For an overview of the privacy issues concerning the Belgian e-ID card see Alsenoy and Cock
(2008).
8Art. 2 (d) EU Data Protection Directive, compare with Art. 1 §4 of the Belgian Privacy Act.
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anonymous or whether the user is just pseudonymous towards the e-petition
web server and thus the latter processes personal data.
In defining whether the data in the e-petition system are anonymous or
simply pseudonymous, Recital 26 of the Data Protection Directive needs to
be mentioned. This article stipulates that in deciding whether data could be
used to identify a particular person “account should be taken of all the means
likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to
identify the said person”. Clearly, if the controller is in possession of both the
pseudonymized data and the key with which to deanonymize them, the data
are identifiable and data protection provisions apply.
The notion of identifiability differs between the European Member States.
The German legislation, for instance, has adopted a more pragmatic ap-
proach to the notion of identifiability. The German Federal Data Protection
Law (BDS 1990) in Art. 3(6) defines the notion of “anonymization” as follows:
“‘Rendering anonymous” means the modification of personal data so that the
information concerning personal or material circumstances can no longer or
only with a disproportionate amount of time, expense and labour be attributed
to an identified or identifiable individual”.9 The definition of anonymisation
allows the deduction of the following argumentum a contrario: personal data
are information that can be attributed to an identified or identifiable individual
without a disproportionate amount of time, expense and labour. The data
protection laws of France, Belgium and Sweden, on the other hand, have
adopted a broad interpretation of the concept of personal data, rendering any
information as personal data, if an individual can be identified, regardless of
the technical or legal difficulties in determining the identity of the individual.
Thus according to the Belgian legal interpretation of the term personal data
and as long as the deanonymization key is out there somewhere, the data are
identifiable, no matter how unlikely it is that the controller and the key holder
would cooperate.
As supported by the legal scholars “pseudonymous data are still subject
to data protection law, since they could be tied to the individual” (Kuner
2007). The Article 29 Working Party has adopted a similar position, stating
that “[r]etraceably pseudonymized data may be considered as information on
individuals which are indirectly identifiable” (Party 2007). It is interesting how-
ever, to mention that the Article 29 Working Party in the same opinion, stated,
with regard to key-coded data in statistical and pharmaceutical research, that
if all technical measures (e.g., cryptographic, irreversible hashing) have been
taken to assure that the identification of the data subject is not expected or
supposed to take place under any circumstance, the Data Protection Direc-
tive is not applicable. Even more difficult is the situation where seemingly
anonymous data becomes identifiable through statistical analysis or cross-
referencing.
9Unofficial translation available at http://www.bfdi.bund.de.
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The Belgian e-ID is by purpose and design a rich source of personal data.
Whilst well suited for conventional identity checks (e.g., by the police or
government officials), this becomes a disadvantage in any situation that re-
quires both strong authentication and anonymity or at least increased privacy.
The data protection legislation in Belgium is based on a very broad concept
of identifiable data, encompassing even data that can not be deanonymized
without considerable effort or without colluding with others.
However, reverse identifiability is not possible in our e-petition system.
Although the Credential Issuer knows the identity of the user that asks for a
credential, it does not know which specific credential has been assigned to her.
The Credential Issuer just knows that a specific user was given “a” credential
with certain attributes encoded. For instance, let us assume the age is the only
attribute encoded in the credential and that the proof of knowledge is proving
that the age of the credential holder is at least 18 years old (age ≥ 18). When
the Credential Issuer issues 10 credentials, 8 of which were given to people with
age ≥ 18, he will only be able to verify that the credential holder is actually
older than 18 but in no case will he be able to tell which of the 8 possible
users she is. Thus, the privacy preserving e-petition system does not allow
any kind of reverse identifiability and does not provide any mechanisms for
deanonymization.
The proof of knowledge generates a number, deterministically from other
parameters such as petition ID. When a user signs the e-petition multiple
times, the number will appear several times, meaning that the e-petition web
server will be able to tell that two signatures were created by use of the
same credential, so that duplicates are removed. However, neither the e-
petition web server, nor the certificate issuer, as already discussed above, will
be able to define which specific user had this credential and produced these
signatures. It shall be noted at this point that even signatures of the same user
on different e-petitions are unlinkable. As already mentioned above, Belgium
has adopted a broad interpretation of the concept of personal data, rendering
any information as personal data, if an individual can be identified, regardless
of the technical or legal difficulties in determining the identity of the individual.
Even under this broad interpretation, there is no possibility in our system to
trace back the identity of the credential holder. Neither the e-petition web
server, nor the certificate issuer are able to get back to the identity of the
credential holder. Therefore the data that are processed by the e-petition web
server are anonymous and the data protection legislation will not apply.
Conclusions
We have presented our design of a privacy preserving electronic petition
application, which we have implemented as proof-of-concept demonstrator.
Our design shows that anonymous credential protocols can be used to extend
existing PKI-based national e-ID infrastructures, to achieve a degree of secu-
rity and privacy protection that PKI alone cannot provide.
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Instead of directly signing petitions with the existing Belgian e-ID card, we
use it to provide initial strong authentication, and ensure that each user obtains
at most one anonymous credential. The use of the anonymous credential in the
e-petition signing process ensures maximum privacy protection through data
minimization. Our protocol detects multiple signing and thus prevents mali-
cious behavior with no need for identification. We have introduced anonymous
credentials, studied the privacy and security requirements of the e-petition
application, presented an overview of our design’s architecture and protocols,
and discussed the applicability of data protection legislation.
Several open issues remain. We have not discussed mechanisms for creden-
tial revocation, secure storage of credentials, or practical deployment issues.
While the implementation of a system that provides all these functionalities
may not be trivial, these are engineering issues that can be overcome.
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